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Has the Era of Privacy Come to an End?
Avner Levin*
Abstract
This keynote address to the 2016 McGill Law Graduate Conference provides a
brief history of privacy before discussing contemporary challenges in the form of
increasing technological ability to create, store and process personal information,
and powerful advocacy against privacy from both government and the private
sector. In order for privacy to survive, a new set of personal information protection
principles is required and new ways of enforcing these principles must be developed,
which will leverage the power of technology to develop hybrid regulatory/
technological solutions, such as Google’s content removal tool.

INTRODUCTION
A talk such as this is always an opportunity to stand back and reflect on the
state of the field, so to speak. As I set about doing that, I was struck by how
pessimistic I was about the future of privacy. In fact, and that is the reason for
the title of this essay, I believe that unless we take collectively, as a society, and
not only in Canada but internationally, urgent steps to protect, or salvage, our
privacy, the era of privacy and personal information protection will soon come
to an end.
What I hope to take you through in this essay is a (brief) history of privacy,
focusing more on the modern era and then a look at the technological and
political developments that have been plaguing privacy for a few years now. I will
end with a few hopeful suggestions as to how we could counterbalance these
developments with a mix of legal, regulatory and technological responses.

I. A (BRIEF) HISTORY OF PRIVACY
We do not often think about it, but privacy is, of course, a very culturally
dependent idea. For example, privacy in Japan is based on a societal-normative
foundation of customs and traditions1 (and then of course they have legislative
data protection layers as well2). So, I apologize, but my ‘‘history” of privacy is
really a history of a common-law, and to some extent, a civil-law idea of privacy.
It certainly is not a comprehensive or comparative review.
*
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Most legal scholars begin their discussion of privacy with the American
paper by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis about the right to be ‘‘let alone.” 3
The paper, written in the late 19th century, was the first attempt by celebrities of
that era (the upper class) to limit access to information about them, and to retain
for themselves the ability to manage and control their reputation, their image in
the eyes of others, their dignity, and their brand. Of course, the paper was not
written exactly like that, but as a general right to be let alone, and it has been
adopted and cited endlessly by privacy scholars in the field.
Interestingly, and we will return to this point later, the Warren and Brandeis
article was not concerned about the contemporary American preoccupation with
government surveillance. It was about (anti)social interactions. The more
significant immediate point I would like to make about the Warren and
Brandeis article, vis-à-vis a history of privacy, was that it established a private
legal action framework for privacy in the United States (U.S.), or in other words,
a tort. That was a very typical ‘‘common-law” solution to the issue of privacy as
the authors understood it, but the rapid adoption of their article meant that
Americans did not really pause to consider other legal solutions, such as
legislation and government regulation.
Indeed, the next big development in the U.S. was the paper by Dean William
Prosser in 1960 at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law. Prosser,
a tort expert, established four privacy torts in his paper ‘‘Privacy”. 4 That second
influential paper cemented the perception in America that private legal action is
the preferred mechanism to deal with private sector disputes. Since then,
legislation in the U.S. has been a patchwork quilt of special interest
accommodations,5 such as video store records.6
But let us leave the private sector for a moment and go back to those
concerns about governments. In Europe, post-World War II, and generally in the
West throughout and after the Cold War, recognition grew that government
surveillance was just as big of a concern, if not more so, because of the state’s
coercive powers, than any form of private sector invasion of privacy.
In both Europe and in the U.S. we therefore see legislation that aims to curb
government power to collect sensitive information about individuals, and to
subject it to well-defined protective principles. These are known in the U.S. as
Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs). The Americans identified five
original principles in 1973, which were: notice, choice, access, security, and
enforcement.7 The Europeans and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
3
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and Development (OECD) then added more principles in the 1980s and
expanded these five principles into eight.8 Since 2001, in Canada there are now
ten principles enshrined in Canada’s private sector privacy legislation, the
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act.9
These principles, and equally important, the regulatory framework that
developed around their enforcement in the form of independent information and
privacy commissions, data protection authorities, or privacy enforcement
authorities that now make government departments, agencies and ministries as
well as the private sector in Europe and Canada accountable, ushered in the
‘‘Golden Age” of privacy. This Golden Age started in the mid-1970s and, I fear,
it has just about ended or is in the process of ending. So, let us now talk about
this Golden Age, how it came to be, and why it is coming to an end.

II. THE MODERN ERA GOLDEN AGE OF PRIVACY
The Golden Age of privacy came about because these privacy principles (I
will refer to them collectively as such for the sake of consistency) had real
meaning at the time — following them literally changed information
management and provided individuals with real control over their information
and who else had it. Control became the essence of personal information
protection, and the language of these privacy principles also captured principles
of choice, consent and, to a lesser degree, notice. The Germans developed the
idea of ‘‘informational self-determination” — the ideology that control over your
information allowed you to determine and shape your identity, your sense of self,
and that this should be an individual right, rather than a government dictate. 10 It
is sadly obvious to see how the Germans, learning the lessons from the Second
World War, would want to wrest control over the identification of individuals
out of the hands of government for good.
Technologically, what allowed members of society to exercise control over
their personal information, was the feeble (in modern terms) processing and
storage powers of computers at that time. For example, the hard drives sold in
the 1970s and 1980s only had between 500MB to 1GB of storage. Manufactured
by International Business Machines (IBM), they were the size of a washing
machine and weighed over 500lbs. And they cost $35,000.11
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Furthermore, personal information was not collected continuously by
governments or by the private sector. Instead, it was collected in a series of
discrete interactions. We were able to make separate decisions about whether we
wanted to provide information and what information we would provide on a
variety of issues, such as when we filled out our income tax returns, or our
government census, or applied for a passport or a driver’s licence, or, when we
shopped, whether we would provide the store with our postal code or telephone
number. All of these interactions largely depended exclusively on us to be the
source of information about us, and so, we were able to decide whether we
wanted to interact, what information we would share in the interaction, and
under what conditions. We had, in the language of modern-day principles, a
meaningful opportunity both to consent to the collection of our information and
to understand the purposes (as in the examples I just mentioned) for which this
information would be put to use. Finally, the information collected about us and
processed about us was stored in discrete stand-alone proprietary databases both
in the private sector as well as in governments. Special effort was required in
order to share and transfer (i.e., disclose) information about us between
government departments.
The combination of all of these created the Golden Age of privacy. We felt,
largely correctly, that we were in control. We felt that if we decided not to
provide information to the government or to a business about us then the
government or that business would not know or have access to that personal
information. We felt that the purposes for which our information was used were
well-defined and limited; we felt that we knew, or could know if we wanted to,
what information was stored about us. In other words, we felt that the privacy
principles were meaningful and real. Then slowly, gradually, incrementally,
everything changed. And today, we may well be witnessing the end of the privacy
era.

III. THE END OF PRIVACY
There are various estimates on the internet as to how much data is processed
in this day and age in order to enable our data-rich lifestyle. Let us pick one
estimate, by a company called Domo, which is a snapshot as of 2016.12 The
statistics boggle the mind, demonstrating how far we have come in 35 years in
terms of storage and processing power. Almost a million Tinder swipes. Every
minute. That is pretty personal. Close to two-and-a-half million posts liked on
Instagram. Every minute. This is a tremendous amount of personal information.
And just about seven million Snapchats, again, every minute. All of this personal
information created, stored and processed every minute of every day in 2016.
You can see, therefore, why privacy protection is collapsing. The principles
are no longer up to the task. Let us not forget, as well, that these statistics are
12

Josh James, ‘‘Data Never Sleeps 4.0”, (28 June 2016) Domosphere (blog), online:
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about private sector information processing. Governments around the world
have seen a similar rise in their capacity. Most recently, and infamously, that was
demonstrated by Edward Snowden through his revelations about the capacity of
the National Security Agency (NSA) in the U.S. The NSA’s Utah Data Center
holds by some estimates 12EB of information.13 That is twelve billion times more
information than the IBM 1980 hard drive capacity referenced above. In
Canada, we are slowly learning about the capacity of our own Communications
Security Establishment, a governmental cryptologic agency, and about the
cooperation between like-minded nations such as the Anglo Five Eyes (United
States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). This form of
information sharing is a far distance from those old IBM mainframe databases,
those good old-fashioned silos of information.
Our control over information has loosened not only because of the increase
in our technological capabilities, but just as much because of the change we have
undergone in the way we socialize. Social media is (unfortunately) here to stay
which proves that we may be increasingly interested in controlling our
information, but also, that we are just as interested in other people’s business
and lives, in gossip and in information sharing. We are human beings and we do
as humans would, whether offline or online. Among the many implications for
privacy is this — personal information about us no longer originates exclusively
with us. Others can be a rich source of information about us through their
activities, and both governments and the private sector can deduce, generate if
you will, personal information about us through analysis of so-called meta-data,
and by other means.
So, we are now in an era where there is increasing technological ability to
process information, and more personal information that is created and available
for processing by individuals. This information is proliferated by sensors and
devices known as the ‘‘internet of things,” by other individuals ‘‘socializing”
online, and by the analyses of this information. Now, to add to this privacy
horror story, we must not forget about the advocacy from both governments and
the private sector to bring about normative change to diminish the value of
privacy, whether in the name of national security or in the name of profit (as
Zuckerberg and many others did and will do).14 All of these erode privacy and
erode our control over our personal information and our ability to decide what
happens with it. All of this offers clear evidence that the privacy principles of
yesteryear are no longer powerful, meaningful or relevant. As a result, I argue

13
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Suggest It Holds Less Info Than Thought”, Forbes (24 July 2013), online: <www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/07/24/blueprints-of-nsa-data-center-in-utah-suggestits-storage-capacity-is-less-impressive-than-thought/>.
Bobbie Johnson, ‘‘Privacy no longer a social norm, says Facebook founder”, The
Guardian (11 January 2010), online: <www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan/11/
facebook-privacy>.

22

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[15 C.J.L.T.]

that in the absence of corrective action our privacy will soon come, if it has not
already, to an end.

IV. A NEW HOPE
So, what if at all can be done? The legal and regulatory answer is clear — we
need a new set of personal information protection principles and we can discuss
some proposals in this regard. What is perhaps not as clear is that we need new
ways of enforcing our privacy principles. The regulatory frameworks within
agencies and commissions that once worked for us may perhaps need to evolve
and take on new roles.
First, let me talk a bit about the shape that such new principles could take.
There have been many initiatives in recent years that could be characterized as
either conservative or radical, from the revised OECD principles, 15 to the new
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation with its intriguing
inclusion of new principles such as article 25, ‘‘data protection by design and
by default” and article 17, the ‘‘right to be forgotten.”16 All of these are worthy
of their own devoted talks, but I want to focus today on a rogue group of
academic and industry leaders that came together a few years ago through
collaboration mainly between Microsoft and the University of Oxford’s
‘‘Oxford’s Internet Institute”.17 Their radical proposal was to suggest that it is
perhaps time to abandon the principles of notice and consent and to move
towards principles that restrict and limit the use and processing of information. 18
If you go back to the information presented by Domo19 you will perhaps
understand why the Oxford-Microsoft group believes that notifying and asking
people to consent to the processing of their data — in the manner it is currently
done — does not offer individuals meaningful protection and control over their
information. Instead, it offers corporations a fig leaf of legality (also known as a
privacy policy, or ‘‘terms of use”) to cover their continuous data processing
activities. Put differently, the act of consent is a discrete, singular act, whereas the
processing of data is continuous. What the Oxford-Microsoft group suggests is
that meaningful protection in the era of our privacy and personal information
will only be found by tightening the constraints over the uses and purposes for
15
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OECD, ‘‘2013 OECD Privacy Guidelines”, online: <www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/
privacy-guidelines.htm>.
EC, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data
Protection Regulation), [2016] O.J., L. 119 [General Data Protection Regulation].
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which information can be processed, and by focusing on processing that has
significant implications for individuals. These include admission decisions to a
university, insurance coverage, employment, hiring and disciplinary decisions
and healthcare provisions.20 Many, many other commercial purposes and
processing — for example, for advertising and marketing — would be subject to
a risk/benefit analysis,21 which critics have understood to mean that such uses
would not be restricted at all.22
It is easy to see why the Oxford-Microsoft proposal is both attractive and
horrifying at the same time. Does it offer us a brave new hope? Or does it simply
surrender the battle over privacy? I think it offers us some hope, but only if we
change the way that we currently enforce our principles of privacy protection,
which brings me to my second point.
So, second — how do we provide meaningful privacy protection in this day
and age, and perhaps, even for tomorrow? We need to find a way to continuously
offer individuals control, choice and all those other Golden Era privacy
principles. And it is no surprise that we will need technology to do that. In fact,
we will need to combine regulatory and technological responses and we will need
regulatory and legal decisions to directly determine and dictate technological
privacy protective measures. In other words, we will need more Google Spain
decisions,23 or perhaps, if we cast our net a bit more broadly and earlier in time,
we need more DMCAs (which is, if you forget, the U.S. Digital Millennium
Copyright Act).24
What the DMCA did legally was to establish legal liability for corporations
that could be seen to facilitate intellectual property (IP) infringements, unless
they could demonstrate their IP protective actions.25 What the DMCA achieved
technologically was the creation of an interface, largely automated, through
which IP rights could be pursued and protected.26 As a result, when I look for the
latest episode of a popular television show, such as Mr. Robot on YouTube or
Google, I cannot easily find it. Note that I did not say I cannot find it at all —
but I think it is a fair assumption that most non-tech-savvy folks would conclude
that if they cannot find it easily on YouTube or Google then it is nowhere to be
found on the internet. And that of course is of vital importance to privacy and is
20
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the beauty of the Google Spain decision as well. For the significance of that
decision is not only in its confirmation of a right to be forgotten, but also in
Google’s decision in its aftermath to create a technological interface, similar to
the IP interface, that would allow individuals to submit privacy requests easily
and efficiently. It is not a perfect process, and there is much to improve, but it is a
start.27
I can think of a couple other examples, very quickly, in which a regulatory
decision could leverage technology, and which could push back against the
collection of personal information through the proliferation of sensors and the
Internet of Things. Police body-camera video feeds, for example, could be
encrypted by default with judicial approval required in order to decrypt the
images. Drone manufacturers could be legally required to geo-fence 28 their
devices so they could only be flown in open spaces. Manufacturers that do not
comply will face legal liability for the resulting illegal processing of personal
information. No doubt many more similar examples can come to mind.
We need many more such legal and regulatory decisions, and we need to
provide private and public sectors with the right incentives, both positive and
punitive that would encourage them, nudge them, and, if necessary, force them to
come up with more such solutions. Inescapably, in the Canadian context, this
leads to the continued call for greater enforcement and order-making powers for
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada that would place the Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada (OPCC) on a level plain with other data protection and
privacy enforcement authorities worldwide. Such mechanisms should ensure that
the private sector views the OPCC as a significant regulator.

V. CONCLUSION
We may be witnessing the end of an era, the era of privacy and personal
information protection. Hastened along toward its demise by rapid technological
development and new social and political paradigms of information sharing,
personal information protection can still be salvaged through a new regulatory
approach. This approach should focus on the retention of consent in meaningful
instances which have significant implications for individuals — such as in
healthcare, employment, and education contexts. In Canada, the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada must be equipped with enforcement and ordermaking powers comparable to other jurisdictions. Globally and locally, further
legislation and regulation must protect privacy by leveraging the power of
technology to develop hybrid regulatory/technological solutions along the lines
of the Google Spain decision and the DMCA. If we could find a way to protect IP
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for strong commercial interests despite technological developments surely we can
find a way to do the same for privacy.

